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Abstract 
This paper discusses the political economy of U.S. state corporate tax reforms. Using a unique 
dataset of state effective corporate tax rates over the period 1969-2015, I observe that business tax 
changes are associated with tax competition, swings in economic cycles, and left-right political 
ideology. In contrast, long-term debt and budgetary pressures do not correlate with state corporate 
tax policies. Moreover, I document a regional heterogeneity and notice a slowdown in state tax 
changes after the Federal Reform Act of 1986. These findings matter for the empirics of corporate 
tax incidence, which is increasingly concerned with the endogeneity between tax reforms and other 
economic developments.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the last few decades, several U.S. states have lowered their tax rates on business profits. If 
the incidence of such policies has received a great deal of attention, very few empirical works have 
explored the motivations behind such reforms. Though long-term growth, globalization, public 
debt (Swank and Steinmo 2002, Tanzi 1995), tax competition, domestic business cycle, and 
regional shocks have all been suggested as potential drivers of national corporate tax reforms, no 
exhaustive investigation has been done at the state level. This consideration is critical for the 
consistency of empirical estimates of state corporate tax effects. I articulate in this paper that the 
major source of endogeneity when studying the incidence of state corporate tax changes in the 
U.S. results from spatial correlation due to tax competition, as well as political ideology that could 
itself affect other unobservables that determine economic outcomes.       
Specifically, I conclude that the political affiliation of the party in control of a state’s institutions 
correlates with corporate tax changes even after controlling for economic trends. I also observe 
that the average rate of neighboring states and pre-existing economic conditions affect incentives 
to change the business tax. In contrast, long-term debt and budgetary pressures do not seem to bear 
any significant relationship with state corporate tax reform. Finally, I document a heterogeneity in 
the frequency of tax changes across regions and notice a slowdown in state corporate tax increases 
after the federal tax reform of 1986.  
Early classical economists have long defended that the mobile nature of capital assets poses several 
challenges to public authorities seeking to raise taxes to finance social obligations. This argument 
was later confirmed by Harberger (1962) and a number of public economists (Randolph 2006, 
Reveendra 1975, Gravelle 2006) who set to investigate the incidence of the corporate tax in a basic 
two-sector general equilibrium model. The mechanics at the source of these groundbreaking 
theoretical works suggest that the burden of a tax change would fall predominantly on the less 
mobile factor (i.e.) labor.  
The empirical literature (Carroll et al. 2010, Hassett et al. 2006 and Vartia 2008) provided further 
evidence in support of this prediction. As a consequence, policymakers grew skeptical of the 
economic benefits of taxes on capital returns. However, many of the works seeking to measure the 
corporate tax incidence are plagued with identification issues due to the potential endogeneity 
between policy reforms and pre-existing trends in outcomes of interest. Understanding the political 
economy of state corporate tax reforms is critical for the design of a suitable empirical strategy 
when estimating this causal effect.  
The most cited sources of endogeneity between corporate tax policies and labor market outcomes 
originate from the increasing wave of globalization and the rise of social expenditures in advanced 
economies. The former increased the bargaining power of capital assets, which in turn exerted 
downward pressure on effective corporate tax rates around the globe. In contrast, the rise in social 
obligations and the growing presence of the public sector in rich economies tend to pull tax rates 
upward. Both sources undoubtedly affect the demand for labor by firms as well as the incentive to 
work by households. This is compounded by the current debt-adverse environment which limits 
the ability of many governments, specially at the sub-national level, to borrow on financial markets 
to offset the upheavals of the business cycle. These considerations highlight the trade-off at the 
center of the corporate tax debate, and the need to consider endogeneity when measuring the 
incidence of corporate taxation. 
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Alternatively, there is mounting evidence suggesting a rise of tax competition across U.S. 
jurisdictions to attract private investments and stimulate economic growth (Chirinko and Wilson 
2017). Secular stagnation shifted the policy debate to low-productivity growth,  contributing to the 
adoption of tax expenditures by several state and local governments to attract corporations and 
promote capital investment. Corporate taxation is part of an arsenal of instruments at the disposal 
of policymakers to spur long-term economic growth. This implies that corporate tax rates in 
neighboring states could be useful predictors of policymakers’ incentives to amend the business 
tax code. 
Finally, ever-decreasing levels of corporate tax collections at the national and local levels 
contributed to the re-emergence of a widespread interest in tax reform. The main goal is to reduce 
inefficiencies and eliminate incentives to minimize tax liabilities through profit-shifting (Klassen 
et al. 2012, Mintz and Smart 2003).  All ideologies across the political spectrum increasingly favor 
some changes to the corporate tax system. Liberal policymakers would like to close tax loopholes 
while conservatives defend that high corporate tax rates impede capital formation, employment, 
and growth.  
In so far as the decreasing share of corporate income taxes in public revenue is driven by 
globalization and its implications on the fungibility of capital; one should expect the relationship 
between corporate tax rates and the usual outcomes of interest to be confounded by other forces. 
Also, since developments with regards to openness, trade and financial liberalization are generally 
set at the federal level; incentives to amend the corporate tax code in response to these forces 
should remain identical across states. I address this consideration with time specific effects in most 
regressions.  
The goal of this paper is to provide a thorough description of the political economy of corporate 
tax reforms at the state level in the U.S. I exploit a unique historical record of state effective 
corporate tax rates over the period 1969-2014 which was initially compiled by Chirinko and 
Wilson up until 2008. First, I extended this dataset to 2014 using information in the “Books of 
States” reports provided by the Council of State Governments. I then observed that state corporate 
tax changes are associated with tax rates in neighboring states, developments in tax reforms at the 
federal level, and the party affiliation of a state’s political control. In contrast, movements in the 
business cycle and long-term debt do not predict corporate tax changes. I also observe a stark 
heterogeneity in the frequency of business tax reforms across regions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature, with 
a focus on the potential determinants of tax policy reforms at the national level. Section 3 describes 
the structure of state corporate taxation in the U.S. and analyzes recent trends in state corporate 
tax hikes and cuts, while Section 4 presents the data sources. Section 5 discusses the methodology 
and section 6 analyzes the main findings. Section 7 highlights the implications for the empirical 
literature while section 8 concludes the analysis. 
2. Relevant literature 
The political economy of tax reforms has been the subject of a wealth of scholarly papers, books, 
and news articles. Though a great deal of this interest has captured the attention of political 
scientists, a growing body of development research seeks to understand the sociopolitical 
institutions at the source of tax reforms. Tax policy has always been suggested as a key instrument 
for development (Tanzi and Zee 2000, Bird R.M. 1992, Easterly and Rebelo 1993). The theoretical 
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baseline underlying these analyses derives from the neoclassical Solow-Swan growth model and 
its implications for capital accumulation, growth, and development. These authors defend that 
taxes on certain goods or assets could impede investment and limit economic growth in the long-
run.  
The overwhelming consensus in this literature supports that taxes are vital for long-run economic 
prosperity. Personal and corporate income tax, value-added taxes on imported investment goods 
and investment tax credits can all be used to promote saving, investment, and growth (Tanzi and 
Zee 2000). Notwithstanding the fact that these predictions predominantly focus on developing 
nations, the same mechanics might be relevant for several advanced economies due to the current 
environment of low productivity growth and secular stagnation. The corporate tax, in particular, 
affects the user cost of capital and could alter investment incentives in the long-run. This implies 
that long-term economic growth could be an important motivation for corporate tax reforms both 
at the national and local level. 
Other often cited determinants of tax policy relate to the business cycle. It is well documented that 
during periods of economic recession, automatic stabilizers would negatively affect public revenue 
and income tax collection while the opposite is likely to occur in periods of booms. In advanced 
economies, policymakers are generally prone to adopting countercyclical fiscal measures to offset 
the adverse effects of economic downturns. These include personal and business income tax relief 
but also investment credits and several provisions related to capital accumulation. The empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of such Keynesian policies remains a longstanding controversial 
debate (Chodorow-Reich et al. 2012). Several Neoclassical economists have challenged the notion 
that public expenditures could be used to smooth the upheavals of the business cycle. Even though 
the federal corporate tax code did not feature dramatic changes over time, on average five U.S. 
states amend their corporate tax structure every year and regional and local economic cycles might 
influence such decisions.  
Another set of reasons why a state would alter its tax code relates to globalization and the growing 
competition between jurisdictions both within and across countries to attract businesses. As 
evidenced by a series of papers (Altshuler et al. 2015, Devereux et al. 2008), countries are engaged 
in a race to the bottom with regards to business tax rates. Strategic tax competition has also been 
documented between states and counties in the U.S. (Brueckner 2003). The theoretical tax 
competition literature can be categorized by two sets of results. The generally accepted consensus 
of a positive tax reaction function – tax rates of a jurisdiction would move in the same direction as 
those of competing counterparts – has been recently challenged by a series of papers (Mintz and 
Tulkens 2006, Wilson and Janeba 2005) that explored the possibility of a negative or uncertain tax 
reaction slope. However, the empirical literature heavily favors the dominant view of an increasing 
“race to the bottom” between countries and states.  
Alternatively, long-term debt has been suggested as a potential driver of corporate tax policy. How 
governments respond to debt accumulation remains a controversial subject within the 
macroeconomic literature. Some argue that in the face of a growing debt, policymakers should 
adopt corrective measures that involve meaningful increases in tax rates (Bohn 1998). This line of 
thought finds support in the literature of optimal government finance, which also recommends 
moderate budget deficits. Deviations from the stationary debt equilibrium should be offset by 
reduced social obligations or increases in tax rates; suggesting that state corporate tax reforms 
could be driven by debt considerations.  
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Finally, ideas such as economic theories influence policies and social outcomes. The neoliberal 
order that emerged during the 1980s emphasized the importance of individual choice, limited 
government and private markets for prosperity. This shifted the political debate to the role and 
extent of government presence in the economy, especially in rich countries. A few publications 
(Campbell 1998) have suggested that the “Reagan Revolution” of the 1980s may have tilted all 
shades of the political spectrum towards market-friendly policies.  
The sources of this expansion of free-market ideas during the early 1980s have also received a 
substantial wealth of research attention. If ideas influence policy agenda and the 1980s featured an 
ideological inclination in the direction of market deregulation and government retrenchment, one 
would expect a reduction in the frequency of state corporate tax increases after the mid-1980s. I 
test this hypothesis with a period dummy that equals one after 1986, year symbolizing the last 
major federal tax reform in the U.S. and a reference point during the “Neoliberal” takeover. I also 
explore the importance of left-right political ideology in state corporate tax reforms with a dummy 
measuring the party affiliation of policymakers. Figure 1 summarizes the potential sources of 
endogeneity present in the analysis of corporate tax policy reforms.  
Figure 1: Potential sources of Endogeneity in corporate tax reforms 
      
 
As described on the figure, identifying the causal incidence of corporate tax reforms remains a 
remarkable challenge. The diagram above highlights among other things, how the relationship of 
interest is cofounded by unobservables that relate to both the political affiliation of policymakers 
and economic outcomes. These factors which are time-varying in nature (and cannot be addressed 
by typical fixed effects regressions) include hard-to-capture regulations, norms and directives that 
influence business decision-making and outcome variables of interest. But the political shade of 
decision makers is not exogenous and is likely determined by previous economic conditions. 
Therein lies the challenge of measuring these elasticities. The main goal of this paper is to explore 
the significance of these relationships which would cofound the channel of association that runs 
from corporate tax reforms to economic outcomes. 
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3. Background: Structure and trends of state corporate taxation in the U.S.  
On top of the federal corporate income tax rate of 21 percent1, most U.S. states impose a tax on 
the profits of businesses operating within their jurisdiction. Of the 50 states, only five – Nevada, 
South Dakota, Texas, Washington and Wyoming – do not tax corporations as separate productive 
institutions in 2014. Texas and Washington impose a business sales tax on firms irrespective of 
their legal form of organization.  
The tax schedule is not linear in most states2, and provisions are made with regards to the 
deductibility of federal tax payments in some states. Also, the treatment of firms engaged in 
activities across several states varies widely. There is a combined reporting legislation in 23 of the 
45 states with a corporate tax that requires corporations operating in multiple states to report 
aggregate profits for taxation. State tax liabilities are determined on the basis of an apportionment 
rule. This formula uses a combination of sales, property, and employment to estimate taxes due 
within each jurisdiction.  
Among states that tax corporate profits, there is a substantial variation in the state corporate tax 
rate over time. To illustrate these dynamics, I plot the average statutory and effective top marginal 
tax rates over time (See Figure 2). Averaged across states, statutory tax rates increased from 3.7 
percent in 1960 to a high of 7.0 percent in 1993 and have since fallen to 6.5 percent in 2014, the 
lowest it has been since 1981. Only sept states have lower tax rates in 2014 than they did in 1964; 
36 have higher tax rates. Table 1 in the Appendix describes state corporate tax changes between 
1970 and 2014.  
Figure 2: Average statutory and effective state corporate rates  
 
 
The patterns of state corporate tax reforms over time could be broken down into two sub-periods. 
Before the rise of economic liberalism in the early 1980s, the typical state is about twelve times 
more likely to feature a corporate tax increase than a decrease in any given year (See Figure 3). 
This disparity is also associated with substantial differences in rate changes. Prior to 1980, the 
regular state corporate tax cut averages 0.6 percentage point while the usual tax increase averages 
1.1 percentage point. As a result, there is an upward trend in the average state corporate tax rate 
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over the period 1964-1980 (See Figure 2). In contrast, following the two major tax legislations3 in 
the 1980s, there was a reversal in the frequency of business tax hikes and reductions.  
Over the period 1988-2014, there are about three state tax cuts as opposed to one tax increase on 
average in a given year. Relatedly, the average rate cut substantially increased (from 0.6 percent 
to 1.0 percent) while the average rate hike barely changed (from 1.1 percent to 1.0 percent). This 
combination of factors explains the moderate downward trend observed on the average corporate 
tax rate curve over the period 1988-2014.  
 
Figure 3: Number of state corporate tax cuts and hikes over 1969-2014 
 
 
The dynamics described above could be linked to several developments. First, as discussed earlier, 
the 1980s were marked by a series of tax reforms at the federal level. These changes were 
introduced along with other policies that swayed the pendulum of political ideas towards market-
friendly policies and institutions. This context may have contributed to the slowdown in 
policymakers’ incentives to raise taxes on businesses. Plus, the growing nature of tax competition 
between states and localities as well as the deepening of globalization that originated during this 
era could be considered as complementary forces driving these state policies. 
4. Data sources and variables 
The subsequent analysis explores the political economy of state corporate tax reforms in the U.S. 
by utilizing data on state effective corporate income rates over the period 1969-2014. One recurrent 
theme in the empirical literature of corporate tax incidence relates to the difficulty of measuring 
corporate tax liabilities borne by firms. The top marginal statutory rate favored by investigators 
working on this topic features some limitations. It does not capture provisions such as depreciation 
allowances, deductibility of some costs, and rules of expensing that would lower the effective 
burden of the tax on corporations.  
Several U.S. states provide investment tax credits and allow firms to deduct federal corporate taxes 
paid from state taxes owed. These incentives reduce the effective tax rate on corporations. Using 
information in the “Books of the States” reports, Chirinko and Wilson constructed a series of state 
effective corporate tax rates over the period 1964-2006. I extended the dataset to 2014 using 
information available on state websites and statutory corporate rates provided by the Tax 
Foundation. The formula used to construct this variable is described in the Appendix. Variations 
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in this variable might result from statutory corporate rate changes but can also be inherent to 
developments with respect to other provisions that affect the user cost of capital. I consider both 
the statutory and the effective tax rates in all regressions featured in this paper4. 
Tax reform at the state level undergoes a process identical to the design at the federal level. 
Changes to the tax code usually originate from the executive branch of the government which 
submits a new tax legislation to both houses of the legislative branch through the budget process. 
The proposal would thereafter be studied by appropriate committees and submitted for voting after 
potential amendments. The economic literature generally assumes that policy changes reflect the 
median voter’ preferences. However, a recent series of works drawing on public choice theory 
emphasize that policymakers could be motivated by other considerations ranging from self-interest 
to satisfying big donors.  
In this paper, I adopt the traditional view of policy changes reflecting median voter choices for a 
few reasons. First, to the best of my knowledge, there is no organized time series of campaign 
financing and contributions by source for each political candidate at the state level. This 
information is certainly available, but it has not been compiled in a fashion that would enable its 
use in an empirical set-up. Second, even though the literature of public choice analysis has for long 
examined the agency problem involved in public policy decisions, few works empirically tested 
the theoretical predictions due to the lack of an extensive dataset.      
To capture the political control of a state, I use a combination of dummies that measure the 
ideological affiliation of the party controlling the executive branch and both state houses. This 
information is collected online from the National Conference and State Legislature (NCSL) 
website. This bipartisan organization follows changes in the political landscape, policy reforms 
and budget trends across U.S. states over time. I assume that a state is under Republican control 
when both the Executive and the Legislative Houses are controlled by the Republican party. In 
contrast, when both institutions are dominated by Democrats, I consider the state to be under 
Democratic Control. The “No control” dummy refers to a situation where no party controls all 
institutions simultaneously.  
The Bureau of Economic Analysis provides annual statistics on employment and output by 
industry for every U.S. state going back to 1969. The Bureau also releases aggregates of this 
information for the eight economic subdivisions commonly used for regional analysis. I measure 
the growth of employment and output (Gross State Product) as relative annual changes at the end 
of the year. Statistics on state unemployment rates are produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) through the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program going back to 1976. 
This data is derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS) which follows labor market 
participation trends across households monthly. I use these variables to control for business cycle 
fluctuations at the state or regional level. 
Finally, I also explore the extent to which a state’s fiscal position affects corporate tax policies. 
Even in the presence of a Balanced Budget Requirement (BBR), a state can still run deficits over 
a sustained period especially with ex-ante BBR rules. The information on state government debt, 
revenues, expenditures and fiscal position is collected by the Census Bureau going back to 1992 
through the state and local government finance report. The dataset has been extended all the way 
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 Even though this distinction did not matter much for the qualitative implications of this analysis.   
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back to 1967 by Pierson K., Hand M., and Thompson F. (2015) of the University of Willamette 
through the government finance database. Using this information, I constructed a “deficit” dummy 
that equals one if a state runs a fiscal deficit in any given year and control for a state’s debt to 
output ratio in some specifications. I describe the summary statistics of the variables used in all 
regressions in Table 6 in the Appendix.  
5. Estimation 
The empirical work carried out in this paper intends to identify the factors associated with a state’s 
decision to change its business tax code. I am not seeking to uncover the causal relationships 
between the variables of interest and a state’s decision to amend its corporate tax code. The ideal 
experiment that will enable the measurement of such causal effects, would require randomly 
assigning exogenous business cycles or public fiscal position to a state or alternative corporate tax 
schemes to its neighbors, and observe how otherwise similar states react to these developments. 
This is hard to implement, and quasi-experimental settings are cofounded by time-varying 
unobservables. The main objective of this analysis is to identify the set of variables that predict 
corporate tax reforms at the state level, hence exposing the main identification challenges that 
should be a matter of concern to the empirical literature.       
I estimate a model with a panel of 48 U.S. states over the period 1969-2014. I excluded Hawaii 
and Alaska which are not located on the mainland territory and do not face the same degree of tax 
competition from contiguous neighbors. The design of this paper presents a variety of empirical 
issues including spatial correlation in tax policy but also serial correlation in tax changes over time 
at the state level5. I address these considerations by clustering the error terms at the state and 
regional level. In most specifications, I included time-invariant fixed effects to capture unobserved 
differences in the preference for policy reforms in a state. I also included a dummy that equals one 
after the year 1986, which marks the last major federal corporate tax reform in the U.S. I estimate 
the following specifications:  
1 1 11 1986τ α β X θ d uit i it it−∆ = + + +                                                                                                       (1) 
{ 0} 2 1 21 19861 α β X θ d uit i it it∆ < −= + + +τ                                                                                                   (2) 
{ 0} 3 1 31 19861 α β X θ d uit i it it∆ > −= + + +τ                                                                                                   (3) 
Δτit refers to the change of corporate statutory or effective tax change in state i during year t while 
Xit-1 represents a set of covariates measured at i and t-1 and likely to influence state corporate tax 
policies. This set includes the following variables: (i) debt to output ratio, (ii) the difference 
between a state’s corporate rate and the average of its contiguous neighbors, (iii) the growth of 
output, (iv) a dummy for the presence of a fiscal deficit and (v) dummies for the party affiliation 
of the political control of a state’s institutions. αi represents state time-invariant fixed effects while 
θk1 in equation k captures the post-TRA effect on state corporate tax reforms. Notice that this 
parameter is not identified when including year effects.  
The control variables are lagged to account for the general design of tax policy reforms, which are 
usually announced with a one-year lead period. Plus, there is a strong contemporaneous association 
between corporate tax rates and several of the control variables such as budget deficit, debt or 
                                                          
5
 This occurs due to several reasons such as the adoption of successive corporate tax changes within the same 
reform.  
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output growth; and this relationship is not of primary interest in this analysis. I am also aware of 
the consideration that these control variables are endogenous, nonetheless, the lagged controls are 
predetermined with respect to state corporate tax reforms. 
Specification (1) explores the determinants of the magnitude of a state corporate tax change. In 
contrast, specifications (2) and (3) investigate the factors driving incentives to cut or increase the 
rate in the first place. These last two specifications are estimated using a Linear Probability Model 
(LPM) with robust standard errors. Using this approach, I intend to distinguish between a rather 
“intensive margin” associated with the magnitude of state rate changes from a more “extensive 
margin” relative to the decision to cut or increase the corporate rate. 
 
6. Empirical findings 
Table 1 presents the details of the political economy of a state’s statutory and effective corporate 
tax changes. Panel (1) describes the association between the control variables and the magnitude 
of a state’s corporate tax change. Panels (2) and (3) distinguish between incentives driving 
corporate rate cuts and increases. The results exposed in the table suggest that tax competition with 
neighbors, economic cycles and Republican control of a state correlate with corporate tax reforms. 
In contrast, long-term debt and budgetary constraints do not seem to significantly influence these 
policy incentives. I also notice a shift in the pattern of corporate rate changes after the federal Tax 
Reform Act of 1986.  
Table 1: Effects of domestic political economy on statutory and effective corporate tax reforms 
Dependent variable Effective rate(a) Statutory rate(a) 
Specification  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
 Change  Cut  Hike  Change Cut Hike 
Tax competition       
       
   
(a)Diff. with avg. rate of 
contiguous states
 t-1 -0.047*** 1.467* -2.575*** -0.049*** 1.387* -2.083*** 
 (0.016) (0.912) (0.946) (0.017) (0.848) (0.845) 
Domestic economy       
    
(a)Growth output
 t-1 -0.009*** -0.117 -0.724*** -0.006*** -0.132 -0.391*** 
 (0.002) (0.144) (0.175) (0.002) (0.143) (0.148) 
Political Control       
   Republican Control
 t-1 -0.007*** 0.013 -0.048*** 0.007*** 0.052** -0.029** 
 (0.001) (0.023) (0.014) (0.001) (0.026) (0.013) 
   Democratic Control
 t-1 0.000 -0.001 0.014 0.000 0.017 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.015) (0.002) (0.014) (0.016) 
Budgetary pressures       
   Budget Deficit
 t-1 -0.001 -0.011 -0.030** -0.000 -0.016 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.013) (0.013) (0.001) (0.014) (0.012) 
   Debt to output ratio
 t-1 -0.001* -0.036 -0.009 -0.005 0.020 -0.041 
 (0.000) (0.046) (0.024) (0.004) (0.037) (0.019) 
Post-1986 dummy -0.006*** 0.033** -0.036*** -0.006*** 0.034** 0.038*** 
 (0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.012) 
Constant 0.001*** 0.008 0.116***   0.001*** 0.002 0.112*** 
 (0.000) (0.027) (0.021) (0.000) (0.026) (0.018) 
11 
 
       
Observations 1824 1824 1824 1824 1824 1824 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Business Cycle No No No No No No 
Year fixed effects No No No No No No 
R-squared 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 
Each model is estimated by OLS with a panel of 48 U.S. states over the period 1969-2014. 
All standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. (a) Effective and statutory tax changes are measured in 
units (5% is equivalent to 0.05). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
6.1 The role of tax competition  
It appears that a state is more likely to cut its corporate rate when it is above the average of its 
closest competitors but is more likely to increase it when it is below this same average. A one 
percent point above the average of a state’s contiguous neighbors’ rates increases the probability 
of a corporate effective rate cut by 1.46 percentage point and reduces the probability of a corporate 
rate increase by 2.52 percentage points. Alternatively, a one percent point above neighbors’ rate 
associates with an average corporate change of -0.04 percentage points.  
The symmetrical interpretation of this finding implies that the standard error of this estimate might 
be biased if all states react to the same average target. I address this consideration by clustering 
the error term at the region-year level. These patterns support the hypothesis of a positive reaction 
curve and some degree of convergence towards a regional average, though the reaction to 
neighbors’ policies might take a while to manifest.  The literature on tax competition has generally 
defended that states positively react to the tax rates of competitors when designing domestic tax 
policy (Altshuler & Goodspeed 2003) in a game-theoretic set-up.  
This consensus has been recently challenged by a series of works (Chirinko & Wilson 2017) which 
emphasize that the slope of the reaction curve could be negative or uncertain in the presence of 
heterogeneous preferences for public goods across regions. In equilibrium, voters would choose a 
combination of tax rates and public goods to maximize welfare. Corporate tax hikes in neighboring 
states will increase domestic income and might induce a business tax cut if there is a weak 
preference for public goods relative to private goods.  The results in Table 1 support the traditional 
view of a positive reaction function, with states looking to emulate neighbors to remain 
competitive. Though the response to neighbors’ rate changes could take a while to set in, the 
average rate of neighbors in the year preceding a reform is quite informative. This variable is pre-
determined at the moment of a tax reform and summarizes previous corporate tax policies of a 
state’s neighbors. 
6.2 The importance of ideology and political control  
Political ideology not only reflects voters’ preferences but also affects policy developments. Right 
to center affiliation generally correlates with market-friendly and government retrenchment ideas. 
This usually translates into Republican elected officials supporting cuts to business taxation, while 
Democrats are more likely to undertake tax increases to finance social obligations. The results in 
Table 1 confirm this prediction, suggesting that a Republican control of a state’s institutions is 
more likely to induce a statutory corporate tax cut and less likely to result in a business tax hike.  
Specifically, when both houses and the government of a state are under Republican control, the 
probability of a corporate tax cut increases by 5.20 percentage points. In contrast, under the same 
12 
 
circumstances, the probability of a corporate rate hike shrinks by 2.92 percentage points. These 
effects are measured relative to the “No control” scenario when neither party controls all political 
institutions. This finding is interesting if one considers the fact it has been established after 
controlling for economic trends.  
Voters’ preferences for one shade of the political spectrum is often driven by economic conditions 
but also influences the taxation of capital. Alternatively, political ideology might associate with 
several other policies (such as investment tax credits, personal income tax, and other supply-side 
incentives) that in turn shape economic outcomes. The results presented in Table 1 suggest that 
political ideas determine corporate tax policies even when states are exposed to similar economic 
conditions. All else equal, a Republican control of institutions predicts a higher likelihood of a 
business tax cut and a lower probability of a tax increase. In contrast, democratic control does not 
seem to significantly affect corporate tax policies.       
6.3 The influence of the “Reagan Revolution”  
The neoliberal order that emerged in the 1980s resulted in the adoption of several market-friendly 
policies. The theoretical justification for this political revolution can be traced back to the Laffer 
Curve, which suggests that tax cuts might translate into higher tax collections under a set of 
circumstances. The landmark policy that embodies this intellectual school of thought took effect 
through the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 that considerably reduced tax rates on corporate and 
personal income. The reform was followed by a series of market deregulations set to limit the role 
of the public sector in the economy. This philosophical takeover seems to have influenced the 
frequency and direction of state corporate rate changes. 
I notice that after the federal tax reform of 1986, the probability of a state corporate tax cut 
increases by 3.32 percentage points while the likelihood of a state corporate rate hike decreases by 
3.60 percentage points. Plus, the average tax change in a state is 0.62 percentage point lower than 
it was prior to the reform. These results are robust to falsification tests that consider alternative 
structural breakpoints. The change appears to have begun around the aftermath of the TRA and 
remains significant regardless of the party affiliation of state policymakers.  
A few factors can explain this development. First, the interdependency between states and the 
federal government particularly on corporate taxation sets-up a strategic interaction with respect 
to tax rates. Many states allow corporations to deduct federal corporate taxes paid from their state 
liabilities. This implies that a rate change at the federal level will alter state corporate tax revenues 
if nothing is done. Second, the intensification of neoliberal policies at the national level probably 
affected federal grants and other resources available to states, which might in turn, contribute to 
the adoption of business-friendly policies to promote growth and make up for the lost revenue. 
Third and importantly, the wave of market-oriented reforms that marked the Reagan administration 
may have carried through local politics and influenced voters and policymakers’ preferences with 
respect to the size of government in the economy (Campbell, 1998).  
6.4 The impacts of economic conditions and regional heterogeneity       
A major driver of state corporate tax reforms originates from pre-existing economic conditions. 
During regional and local recessions, states are likely to provide tax breaks and several incentives 
to offset the adverse effects of contraction on employment. Corporate tax rates are part of the set 
of instruments that can be manipulated to spur economic growth during downturns. Alternatively, 
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states might increase corporate tax rates or borrow to finance the uptake in social obligations 
(increase in unemployment insurance for example) during recessions. Corporate tax reforms can 
also be motivated by fiscal constraints and public debt. States could increase tax rates to finance 
budget deficits or pay off the public debt. 
The results described in Table 1 indicate that states are more likely to undertake corporate tax 
changes when economic growth is below average. In contrast, running a budget deficit or high 
levels of public debt does not seem to significantly affect the probability of a corporate tax change. 
Specifically, statutory corporate tax increase and decrease occur respectively when output growth 
is 0.39 percentage point and 0.13 percentage point below average, though the latter estimate is not 
statistically significant. I have also explored an alternative specification which controls for the 
average growth of output over a three-year period leading to the corporate tax change and did not 
notice any significant association between pre-existing economic conditions and the propensity to 
cut or increase corporate tax rates. The negative correlation between economic growth and 
increases in corporate tax rates is counterintuitive but offer some support to the hypothesis that 
states raise additional corporate tax revenue to finance expenditures during downturns. The 
empirical evidence on the political economy of tax reforms at the country-level (Swank and 
Steinmo 2002) favors the opposite conclusion (i.e.) a positive correlation between growth and the 
direction of corporate tax changes.    
I also document a heterogeneity of corporate tax reforms across economic regions. As evidenced 
in Table 4 (see Appendix), states in “New England” and the “Great Lakes” are more likely to revert 
to statutory corporate rate increases than those in the West (Far West, Rocky Mountain, and 
Southwest) and the “Southeast”. This result holds with the inclusion of the set of control variables 
used above as well as regional business cycle trends, suggesting that when exposed to similar 
circumstances, states in certain regions are more likely to increase their tax rates than others. I do 
not notice this regional heterogeneity with regards to corporate tax cuts. This finding likely reflects 
unobserved heterogeneity related to the structure of economic activities in a region or the strength 
of regional integration.  
7. Implications for the empirical literature 
The political economy of state corporate tax reforms matters for the empirical literature which is 
increasingly concerned with the identification of corporate tax elasticities. The dominant strategy 
that exploits exogenous variations in corporate tax rates to capture these causal elasticities, though 
flawed (Kahn and Whited 2017), remains valuable. Figure 1.4 presents a schematic description of 
the complexities of corporate tax reforms. The causal effect of interest that runs from tax reforms 
to economic outcomes could be identified with ad hoc empirical approaches.  
As illustrated on the graph, there are several backdoor channels that correlate with both business 
tax reforms and economic outcomes. Some of those are unobserved and several others are just 
hard to measure. An empirical investigation of the short-run corporate tax incidence would 
consider all associations between rate changes and economic outcomes. The figure below 
describes the evidence exposed in this paper. It also suggests that a reliable account of the elasticity 
of interest – relationship (1) – would have to block all other cofounding channels.   
For instance, some empirical works on this topic have used the average rate of neighboring 
states/countries as an instrument for domestic corporate tax policies (Lee and Gordon 2004). This 
method is flawed as evidenced by relationship (6) on the graph. Though neighbors’ rates influence 
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domestic corporate tax policies, they also affect domestic production, employment, and wages 
through activity shifting. Businesses in neighboring states would likely react to tax changes by 
moving part of their production into the domestic economy. This clearly violates the exclusion 
condition. Other papers have compared contiguous counties around state corporate rate changes 
(Ljungqvist and Smolyansky 2014), which might be effective if appropriately designed to block 
all sources of endogeneity.  
Most empirical studies of the corporate tax incidence do not consider the possibility of tax 
competition (Hassett, and Mathur 2006, Hassett et al. 1996) and the implications this will bear on 
the treatment of standard errors. When states (or countries) react to corporate tax policy 
developments in neighboring economies, one classic assumption in panel data regression analysis 
– E(εitεjs)=0  – will not hold true for a pair of contiguous jurisdictions (i,j) over two consecutive 
years (t,s). This suggests that the standard errors should be adjusted for spatial correlation using 
traditional GLS methods.  
I also argue in this paper that an effective identification strategy is one that blocks all backdoors 
especially those that are unobserved or hard to capture such as the effects of neighbors’ policies 
on domestic economic outcomes. Instruments like the average rate of contiguous states/countries 
are only effective when supplemented with additional controls which shut down channels like 
relationship (6). Variables such as distance from neighbors or the existence of regional trade 
agreements could mediate incentives to shift activity across the border – relationship (6) –.   
 
Figure 3: Schematic representation of the endogeneity of state corporate tax reforms 
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8. Conclusion 
Corporate tax policy is the subject of numerous controversies in political circles, as evidenced by 
the ongoing debate on the opportunity of the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” of 2017. Unfortunately, the 
empirical literature remains unsettled on the magnitude of corporate tax effects on the economy. 
Part of this uncertainty is methodological and relates to the difficulty of designing an appropriate 
identification strategy. This limitation cannot be addressed without clearly understanding the 
motivations (the political economy) of corporate tax reforms.  I argue in this paper that U.S. state 
corporate tax reforms are essentially driven by tax competition, left-right political ideology and 
corporate policy developments at the federal level. 
Using a unique historical record of state effective corporate tax rates over the period 1969-2014, I 
observe that state corporate tax cuts and increases are associated with tax rates in neighboring 
states. First, a one percent rate point above the average of a state’s contiguous neighbors’ rates 
increases the probability of a corporate effective rate cut by 1.46 percentage points and reduces 
the probability of a corporate rate increase by 2.52 percentage points. Second, Republican control 
of a state’s political institutions increases the probability of a corporate tax cut by 5.20 percentage 
points and shrinks the probability of a corporate rate increase by 2.92 percentage points. Third, in 
the aftermath of the federal tax reform (TRA) of 1986, the probability of a state corporate tax cut 
increases by 3.32 percentage points while the likelihood of a state corporate rate hike decreases by 
3.6 percentage points.  
In contrast, the presence of a budget deficit and long-term debt do not predict state corporate tax 
changes. This finding differs from Swank and Steinmo (2002) who observed that budgetary 
pressures and debt are associated with corporate rate increases across countries. Differences in the 
ability to borrow on financial markets could offer a plausible explanation to this constrast. U.S. 
states are more limited in their ability to resort to financial markets to raise revenue compared to 
the federal government and many other governments around the world. As a result, public debt is 
generally modest at the state level and policymakers do not usually have to offset a recurrent 
negative fiscal position or high public debts through changes in tax rates. Plus, several U.S. states 
have an ex-post Balanced Budget Requirement (BBR) rule which constraints the propensity of 
sustaining fiscal deficits over a long time period. 
Plus, the results described here have implications for the empirical literature, specifically regarding 
identification strategies. Empirical studies on the incidence of corporate taxation should address 
the presence of time varying unobservables along with spatial correlation due to tax competition. 
Traditional panel studies that observe countries (Vartia 2008, Felix 2007) or states (Carroll 2009) 
might be limited because they do not control for heterogeneous developments in economic 
outcomes across regions. This heterogeneity could stem from political ideology which also 
influences policy changes. Other papers exploit national tax reforms and observe panels of firms 
(Hassett and Hubbard 1996 and Hassett and Mathur 2010) around these presumably exogenous 
policies. The main challenge, in this case, is to account for other policies that affect the control 
units.  
A few empirical works on this topic have used the average rate of neighboring states/countries as 
an instrument for domestic corporate tax policies (Lee and Gordon 2004). This method is flawed 
as evidenced by relationship (6) on figure 1.4. Though neighbors’ rates influence domestic 
corporate tax policies, they also affect domestic production, employment, and wages through 
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activity shifting. Businesses in neighboring states would likely react to tax changes by moving part 
of their production into the domestic economy. This clearly violates the exclusion condition. 
Alternatively, a number of authors compared contiguous counties straddling state borderlines 
around corporate rate changes (Ljungqvist and Smolyansky 2014), which might be effective if 
appropriately designed to block all sources of endogeneity.  
Most empirical studies of the state corporate tax incidence do not consider the possibility of tax 
competition (See for instance Hassett et al. 1996, Carroll 2010) and the implications this would 
bear on the treatment of standard errors. When states (or countries) react to corporate tax policies 
in neighboring economies, the classic assumption of panel regression analysis – E(εitεjs)=0 – will 
not hold true for a pair of contiguous jurisdictions (i,j) over two consecutive years (t,s). This 
suggests that the standard errors should be adjusted for spatial correlation using traditional GLS 
methods.  
This paper recommends using identification strategies that block all backdoors especially those 
that are unobserved or hard to capture. Instruments like the average rate of contiguous 
states/countries are only effective when supplemented with additional controls which shut down 
the possibility of activity shifting. Variables such as distance from neighbors or the existence of 
regional trade agreements could mediate such incentives at the firm level.   
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Appendix A: Tables and figures 
 
Table 2: Results with regional business cycle (deviation of regional employment from average) 
Dependent variable Effective rate(a)  Statutory rate(a)   
Specification  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
 Change  Cut  Hike  Change Cut Hike 
Tax competition       
       
   
(a)Diff. with avg. rate of 
contiguous states
 t-1 -0.007*** 0.793** -0.073 -0.008*** 0.782** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.400) (0.219) (0.003) (0.351) (0.172) 
Domestic economy       
    
(a)Growth output
 t-1 -0.008*** 0.132 -0.703*** 0.005 0.128 -0.442*** 
 (0.002) (0.196) (0.183) (0.003) (0.200) (0.173) 
Political Control       
   Republican Control
 t-1 -0.004*** 0.010 -0.030*** 0.005*** 0.049** -0.013* 
 (0.001) (0.023) (0.008) (0.001) (0.025) (0.009) 
   Democratic Control
 t-1 0.000 -0.006 0.013 0.000 0.015 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.014) (0.000) (0.014) (0.014) 
Budgetary pressures       
   Budget Deficitt-1 -0.000 -0.013 -0.031*** -0.000 -0.016 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.013) (0.001) (0.014) (0.012) 
   Debt to output ratio
 t-1 -0.000 0.037 -0.006 -0.000* 0.020 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.026) (0.015) (0.000) (0.037) (0.012) 
Post-1986 dummy -0.007*** 0.033** -0.043*** -0.008*** 0.031** -0.045*** 
 (0.001) (0.017) (0.013) (0.001) (0.016) (0.013) 
Constant 0.001*** 0.015 0.122   0.001*** -0.003 0.086*** 
 (0.000) (0.024) (0.019) (0.000) (0.026) (0.017) 
       
Observations 1824 1824 1824 1824 1824 1824 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Business Cycle Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No No No 
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Each model is estimated by OLS with a panel of 48 U.S. states over the period 1969-2014. 
All standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Regional Business Cycle is proxied by deviation of 
regional employment from average. (a) Effective and statutory tax changes are measured in units (5% is equivalent to 
0.05). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Results with year fixed effects 
Dependent variable Effective rate(a) Statutory rate(a) 
Specification  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
 Change  Cut  Hike  Change Cut Hike 
Tax competition       
       
   
(a)Diff. with avg. rate of 
contiguous statest-1 -0.007*** 0.814** -0.077 -0.008*** 0.788*** 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.401) (0.216) (0.003) (0.352) (0.167) 
Domestic economy       
    
(a)Growth outputt-1 -0.006*** 0.249 -0.390** -0.007** 0.297 -0.281* 
 (0.002) (0.211) (0.191) (0.003) (0.234) (0.187) 
Political Control       
   Republican Controlt-1 -0.003** 0.015 -0.015* 0.004** 0.044* -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.024) (0.010) (0.002) (0.025) (0.008) 
   Democratic Controlt-1 0.000 -0.011 0.014 0.000 0.015 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.018) (0.013) (0.000) (0.014) (0.013) 
Budgetary pressures       
   Budget Deficitt-1 0.000 0.038*** -0.005 -0.000 0.002 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.018) (0.001) (0.018) (0.015) 
   Debt to output ratiot-1 -0.001 0.029 -0.010 -0.000* 0.034* -0.007 
 (0.000) (0.026) (0.016) (0.000) (0.023) (0.013) 
Post-1986 dummy – – – – – – 
       
Constant 0.009* -0.013 0.143***   0.002*** 0.000 0.192*** 
 (0.005) (0.043) (0.047) (0.000) (0.034) (0.057) 
       
Observations 1824 1824 1824 1824 1824 1824 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Business Cycle No No No No No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Each model is estimated by OLS with a panel of 48 U.S. states over the period 1969-2014. 
All standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Regional Business Cycle is proxied by deviation of 
regional employment from average in a given year. (a) Effective and statutory tax changes are measured in units (5% 
is equivalent to 0.05). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Results with regional heterogeneity 
Dependent variable Effective rate(a) Statutory rate(a) 
Specification  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
 Change  Cut  Hike  Change Cut Hike 
Region (excluded New 
England)       
       
       
  Mideast -0.0004 -0.021 -0.039* -0.0004 -0.029 -0.057*** 
 (0.0003) (0.035) (0.024) (0.0003) (0.028) (0.024) 
  Great Lakes
 
-0.0006 0.024 -0.024 -0.0006 0.017 -0.024 
 (0.0005) (0.037) (0.026) (0.0005) (0.037) (0.024) 
  Plains
 
-0.0002 -0.023 -0.003 -0.0004 -0.033 -0.046** 
 (0.0003) (0.036) (0.029) (0.0003) (0.036) (0.024) 
  Southeast
 
-0.0004 -0.002 -0.036* -0.0005** -0.031 -0.064*** 
 (0.0002) (0.038) (0.024) (0.0002) (0.040) (0.020) 
  Southwest
 
-0.0004 -0.049 -0.026 -0.0004 -0.035 -0.054*** 
 (0.0004) (0.036) (0.024) (0.0004) (0.037) (0.025) 
  Rocky Mountain -0.0002 -0.037 -0.036 -0.0001 -0.049 -0.048** 
 (0.0003) (0.039) (0.027) (0.0003) (0.042) (0.024) 
  Far West -0.0005 -0.034 -0.058** -0.0005 -0.031 -0.061*** 
 (0.0003) (0.030) (0.027) (0.0004) (0.030) (0.023) 
       
Constant -0.0016*** 0.029 0.156***   0.0018*** 0.024 0.165*** 
 (0.0004) (0.045) (0.035) (0.0004) (0.045) (0.031) 
       
Observations 1824 1824 1824 1824 1824 1824 
State fixed effects No No No No No No 
Regional Business Cycle Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All other controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Each model is estimated by OLS with a panel of 48 U.S. states over the period 1969-2014. 
All standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Regional Business Cycle is proxied by deviation of 
regional employment from average in a given year. (a) Effective and statutory tax changes are measured in units (5% 
is equivalent to 0.05). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: State statutory and effective corporate tax rates between 1970 and 2014 
Region State 1970 2014   1970 2014 
  Effective rates (%) Statutory rates (%) 
New England      
 Connecticut 8.0 9.0 8.0 9.0 
 Maine 4.0 8.9 4.0 8.9 
 Massachusetts 7.5 8.0 8.5 8.0 
 New Hampshire 6.0 9.3 7.0 9.3 
 Rhode Island 8.0 9.0 7.0 9.0 
 Vermont  6.0 8.5 6.0 8.5 
Mideast      
 Delaware 6.0 8.7 6.0 8.7 
 Maryland 7.0 8.3 7.0 8.3 
 New Jersey 4.3 9.0 4.3 9.0 
 New York 7.0 7.1 7.0 7.1 
 Pennsylvania  12.0 10.0 7.5 10.0 
Great Lakes      
 Illinois 4.0 7.0 4.0 7.0 
 Indiana 2.0 7.5 2.0 7.5 
 Michigan 5.6 6.0 5.6 6.0 
 Ohio  No Tax 0.3 No Tax 0.3 
 Wisconsin  7.0 7.9 7.0 7.9 
Plains      
 Iowa 6.2 10.1 8.0 12.0 
 Kansas 6.8 7.1 4.5 7.1 
 Minnesota 11.3 9.8 11.3 9.8 
 Missouri 2.6 5.2 5.0 6.3 
 Nebraska 2.6 7.8 2.6 7.8 
 North Dakota 3.1 3.0 6.0 4.5 
 South Dakota No Tax No Tax No Tax No Tax 
Shoutheast      
 Alabama 2.6 4.3 5.0 6.5 
 Arkansas 4.2 6.5 6.0 6.5 
 Florida No Tax 5.5 No Tax 5.5 
 Georgia 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
 Kentucky 7.0 6.8 7.0 6.8 
 Louisiana 2.1 5.3 4.0 8.0 
 Mississippi 4.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 
 North Carolina 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
 South Carolina 6.0 5.0 6.0 5.0 
 Tennessee  5.0 6.5 5.0 6.5 
 Virginia  5.0 6.0 5.0 6.0 
 West Virginia 6.0 6.5 6.0 6.5 
Shouthwest      
 Arizona 6.0 6.5 8.0 6.5 
 New Mexico 5.0 7.3 5.0 7.3 
 Oklahoma  4.0 6.0 4.0 6.0 
 Texas  3.3 No Tax 0 No Tax 
Rocky Mountain      
 Colorado 5.0 4.6 5.0 4.6 
 Idaho 6.0 7.4 6.0 7.4 
 Montana 6.3 6.8 6.3 6.8 
 Utah  6.0 5.0 6.0 5.0 
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Figure 2: Average statutory and effective state corporate rates  
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 Wyoming  No Tax No Tax No Tax No Tax 
Farwest      
 California 7.0 8.8 7.0 8.8 
 Nevada No Tax No Tax No Tax No Tax 
 Oregon  6.0 7.6 6.0 7.6 
 Washington  No Tax No Tax No Tax No Tax 
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Table 6: Summary statistics of main variables 
Variable Description  Mean S. D. Min Max 
 
 
     
davg 
Difference with tax 
average of neighbors overall -0.001 0.028 -0.078 0.072 
 
 between  0.026   
  within  0.012   
 
 
     
cut Corporate Cut dummy overall 0.056 0.230 0.000 1.000 
  between  0.059   
  within  0.222   
 
 
     
hike Corporate Hike dummy overall 0.072 0.258 0.000 1.000 
  between  0.046   
  within  0.254   
 
 
     
repcon Republican control dummy overall 0.182 0.386 0.000 1.000 
  between  0.192   
  within  0.335   
 
 
     
demcon Democratic control dummy overall 0.306 0.461 0.000 1.000 
  between  0.233   
  within  0.399   
 
 
     
ggsp Growth of output overall 0.029 0.037 -0.168 0.305 
  between  0.008   
  within  0.036   
 
 
     
debt_gsp Debt to output ration overall 0.643 0.387 0.030 2.276 
  between  0.338   
  within  0.195   
 
 
     
budef Dummy for budget deficit overall 0.177 0.382 0.000 1.000 
  between  0.075   
  within  0.374   
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Appendix B: Note on the effective corporate tax rates 
The corporate effective tax rates used in this paper are obtained from Chirinko and Wilson (2006). 
On top of the statutory corporate income tax, most states provide firms with instruments that reduce 
the tax burden on profits. Chirinko and Wilson considered the deductibility of federal corporate 
taxes from state tax liabilities to construct an effective corporate tax variable. While some states 
allow full deductibility of federal corporate taxes from state taxable income and other allow no 
deductibility at all, Iowa and Missouri allow only 50% deductibility. Denoting the provision for 
federal tax deductibility in state s over period t as 
,
{1.0,0.5,0.0}s tυ = , the effective corporate tax 
rate in state s in period t is defined by: 
                                                                 
, , ,F
, , ,
(1 )E S L S Es t t s t s tτ τ τ υ= −                                                        (B1) 
 
Where ,L Stτ denotes the statutory corporate tax rate in state s over period t and 
,F
,
E
s tτ represents the 
effective corporate tax rate at the federal level over the same period. Considering that in many 
states the corporate tax schedule is not linear, we measure ,L Stτ with the marginal legislated tax rate 
for the highest bracket. 
 
Similarly, given that state corporate tax payments are fully deductible from federal tax liabilities, 
the effective corporate tax rate at the federal level is given by:  
                                                                   
,F ,F ,S
, ,
(1 )E L Es t t s tτ τ τ= −                                                           (B2) 
Using equations (1) and (2), Chirinko and Wilson suggested that the effective corporate income 
tax rates at the state and federal levels are systematically related. Solving for the effective corporate 
tax rates respectively at the state and federal levels yields the final expressions: 
 
                                                                  
,S L,F
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                                                      (B4) 
Collecting data on state and federal corporate tax rates along with state provisions regarding federal 
tax deductibility, we extended the state effective corporate tax series computed by Chirinko and 
Wilson from 2006 to 2014. 
 
